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examined to determine their utility for the future. To address this requirement the Army's Capabilities Development for Rapid Transition (CDRT) process was developed to identify, assess, and validate systems that have been fielded and transition them into the formal Program of Record acquisition process. This paper analyzes the effectiveness of CDRT process in achieving its objectives and to provide recommendations for how the current transition process can be improved to ensure we are investing in the right force for the future
The Next Acquisition Challenge: Transitioning Enduring Capability

"What I fear more than the strategies of my enemies is our own mistakes" -Pericles (431BC)
After over a decade of war and numerous inward looking studies, the Department of Defense (DoD) has and is continuing to make significant changes to all three key "Big A" processes that are required to deliver new capabilities to the warfighter. They have revised or considered alternative methods to streamline requirement generation and approval within the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS), sought to synchronize Planning, Programming, Budget, and Execution (PPBE) funding processes, and adjust the 5000 Series Defense Acquisition paradigms by leveraging the enhanced buying power of the government, new contract negotiation and structure techniques, competitive development opportunities, and integrated testing. One of the critical modifications was the implementation of various rapid acquisition processes exemplified by Joint Urgent Operational Needs Statement (JUONS) or Army's Operational Need Statement (ONS). To date, most of the JUONS/ONS process improvements have been focused on trying to reduce the time required to execute each of the required acquisition steps in order to minimize the total time from requirement identification to actual fielding in theater. However, now that the war in Iraq is over and Afghanistan is nearing conclusion it is critical that the process for identifying, evaluating, determining, and transferring material solutions from the rapid acquisition process into the defense acquisition Program of Record (PoR) system be given serious consideration. If the services fail to adequately emphasize the transition phase of the JUONS/ONS process, the Department of Defense runs the risk of wasting valuable 2 resources in an austere budget environment by making unsound investments in the next generation of technologies to maintain our military superiority. The Army's Capabilities Development for Rapid Transition (CDRT) process has been a significant development in implementing a framework for meeting this important challenge, however to date its effectiveness has achieved mixed results because of a potential drift from its original purpose.
Rapid Acquisition Process
In 2004, when then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's famously remarked that "you go to war with the Army you have, not the Army you might want or wish to have" 1 in response to why it was taking so long to provide ungraded armor protection to the warfighter, it became clear that the services could no longer rely on the current Defense Acquisition Management System Model. Although, the DoD "Big A" based acquisition process had successfully produced the key weapons systems of the Air down to the lead service process, for example the Army's ONS. The ONS process is then followed "to document the urgent need for a nonstandard and or unprogrammed capability to correct a deficiency or improve a capability that enhances mission accomplishment" 3 of an Army specific nature.
The primary purpose of the JUONS process is to rapidly validate, resource, field the combatant commander's requirement realizing that it is a time-sensitive need for warfighters in combat related on-going operations. 4 The key steps in the process are requirement approval, funding, development, and fielding. with the JUONS priority within the designated portfolio to the Joint Control Board (JCB).
The JCB reviews the FCB recommendations and determines priority across the services and functions. Finally, the Budget Office Director Board approves the various review board recommendations, directs funding allocation, and the designated service to initiate the acquisition process. DoD's goal is to execute these first two steps in 10 days from initial submittal. The ultimate goal of the development and fielding phases is to deliver the capability in as rapid a timeframe as possible, with a goal of between 6 and 18 months depending on the complexity and scope of the requirement. All of the services have similar process, although each has a slightly unique nuances based on the internal acquisition approval hierarchy.
Limitations of Rapid Acquisition
In order to meet that aggressive schedule, the acquisition community divert from ii. System has been in use in theater for at least 120 days.
iii ii. Documented requirement, including associated DOTMLPF implications.
iii. Written endorsement from deployed or recently returned unit.
iv. Assessment from appropriate functional proponent.
v. Proposed implementation strategy.
Once the preliminary list is refined, it is then sent to the CDRT Community of Interest a) Transition to an "APC" or an "EC." This is defined as a system or capability that is required throughout the current or future force.
b)
Sustain. This is defined as a system or capability for current in theater use only.
c)
Terminate. This is defined as stop all further development and support of this system or capability.
Response. This is defined as a system or capability that is unfamiliar to the organization or it falls outside of the organization's purview.
Phase three is the "Recommend" phase of the process consist of reviewing the input from the field, conduct analysis of each candidate final categorization, and preparing the "Recommended List". The critical task of this phase is the assessment of each candidate using Total Point Value (TPV) analysis. 11 If a system or capability receives over 50% of the total possible points and is not categorized "Terminate" by any organization it is considered to be fully supported by the field as an APC or EC. 
Another Approach to the Transition Issue
Before analyzing if the Army process is effectively making these critical determinations it would be useful to see what the other Services are doing to address this same issue. Although the Army has initiated well over 500 Urgent Needs Statement requests, the Marine Corp has also made substantial use of the rapid acquisition process. Since 2001, the Marine Corp has received over 700 requests for different capabilities to meet urgent requirements in theater. 15 The Marine Corps' Urgent Universal Needs Statement, like the other services is designed to "respond to urgent warfighting capability needs by providing the best available solutions to missioncritical capability gaps in an acceptable timeframe to the operating force commander." 16 As of November 2011, 144 capabilities had been fielded to meet these requests.
However, the Marine Corp approaches the issue of determining whether the material solution is solely an interim or an enduring capability that needs to be transitioned in a different manner. The Marine Corps policy outlines specific transition responsibilities to its Subordinate Elements as part of the UNS process. Marine Corps Order 3900.17:
The Marine Corps Urgent Needs Process (UNP) and the Urgent Universal Need Statement (Urgent UNS), already includes the key Assess, Recommend, and Validate phases tasks as follows:
a. Supported Commander of Marine Forces.
(1) The command that generated the requirement will provide a report on the operational effectiveness and utility of those capabilities in order to enable 13 continued improvements to interim solutions and to inform the deliberate processes of the Expeditionary Force Development System (EFDS). 
Does the CDRT Process Work?
When evaluating any process it is critical to determine what the desired outcome is. In the case of the CDRT Process the desired outcome is three-fold: Establish a process that allows for the rapid evaluation of capabilities that have been fielded to Army forces under Urgent Needs Statements, and determine the suitability of those capabilities for continued or enduring use by the force, and quickly convert them into the traditional acquisition process. In order to examine this three-fold outcome one needs to determine the efficiency of the process, the effectiveness of its ability to determine suitability, and the time it takes for them to become traditional Programs of Record (PoR). Although efficiency analysis may be useful to the TRADOC ARCIC ACD action officers who manage the process and a Lean Six Sigma event would identify modifications to the periodicity of reviews, COI distribution process, and user feedback percentages it would not have significant implications to the future of the Army. On the other hand, the effectiveness of the process and the speed of transition is what is critical and should be the Army's focus in the near longer term because the longer unnecessary systems are still supported in the field the more they divert funding from capabilities that the Army will need in the future.
Effectiveness of the Process
As of 22 October 2012, the Army had conducted 14 iterations of the CDRT process. During those reviews they examined 657 material or non-material candidate systems for consideration as to their utility to the future Army. The breakout of the classifications is shown in Table 1 . This implies that these systems work well for CENTCOM missions, but do not have a broader application to other theaters or the Army as a whole. As a result, these systems will continue to require annual OCO funds to be maintained so that the capability resides in theater. The CENTCOM OCO requirement will becoming increasingly difficult to justify to Congress as our involvement in those conflicts continue to deescalate, as evident in the approximately 6% reduction in OCO funds for acquisitions program from 2010 to 2011. 18 More troubling is the determination by the General Accountability Office (GAO) that "Army officials have stated, that the majority of capabilities considered by the CDRT Community of Interest are placed in the sustain category because the Army has yet to make definitive and difficult decisions about whether it wants to keep them and cannot afford to sustain this equipment without overseas contingency operations appropriations." 19 If this perspective is accurate it would indicate that the CDRT's "Validate" phase is not effectively functioning as designed.
So is the GAOs assertion that the Army's over use of the "Sustain" category as a default causing ill informed resourcing decisions valid? To address this question, it is insightful to review both the process and the ARCIC COC deliberations. Several aspects of the process potentially are impacting on the high number of capabilities categorized as "Sustain." First, since ARCIC does not have direct tasking authority over the operational units that are in theater using the equipment, they do not have assurance that they are getting information to and feedback from all of the end users during the Identify and Assess phases. Units can opt in or out of participating in the
process. An example of how difficult it can be gain participation without tasking authority, only 12 of 62 CDRT participants responded to US Army Audit Agency questionnaires about the process. 20 Second, a substantial amount of the feedback is derived from the tactical level and not required to be vetted through the Brigade Commander/Staff level before it is sent to ARCIC during the Assess phase. 40% of previous CDRT participants from the operational force, when asked the importance their leadership placed on this task said it was medium or low when compared to other duties. 21 In a process where one "Terminate" vote with little to no justification can override otherwise strong acceptance of a capability and result in a "Sustain" categorization, the unstructured operational unit review process can have unintended strategic impacts. Lastly, during the Validate phase, the only systems that are reviewed by Senior Army leadership are those categorized as APC/EC or Terminate.
So any capability that is controversial, incomplete or has conflicting performance information can simply be categorized as sustain and it continues to be funded and no one beyond ARCIC or the ARCIC COC is required to make a decision.
In reviewing the ARCIC COC discussions from integration #12 through #15 22 there does seem to be some validity for the GAOs assertion. In the case of several capabilities discussed there were references to CDD/CPD that already addressed the proposed capability or when they could not come to a consensus the decision was 17 made to "sustain" pending more information. For example during iteration #15, the SU-231D 40mm Grenade Launcher Sight was recommended as an APC by both the operational Army and the Maneuver Center of Excellence. However, the rational for not supporting this recommendation (as documented in the comments section of the vote) from a majority of the COC members who voted to categorize the capability as Sustain were related to the systems limited use, reliability, testing, funding strategies, and "sustain capability for further refinement, but never questioned if the requirement for the capability was valid." 23 Another example was the Man Portable Line Charge which had been recommended for termination. However, during iteration #15 it was reclassified as "Sustain" because several of the COC wanted to wait for further information from the ATEC FOA. If the FOA had not been complete, this capability should have never been accepted as a nomination, since that is one of the specified criteria for entry into phase I of the CDRT process. Also of interest, all six of the capabilities that were formally presented, during iteration #14, to the COC were actually USSOCOM program of record developed capabilities that were now being considered for transition to the Army. This is a deviation from the guidance in the "Identify" phase of what criteria is used to nominate a candidate capability as an APC/EC. Since these are USSOCOM programs of record they are already a MS B or later acquisition program and would not have the required ATEC Capabilities and Limitation Report.
In addition, GAO voiced concern that no one senior leader in the Army has oversight and responsibility for the entire fielding and disposition process for nonstandard equipment. As a result, without a single point of responsibility and no way to track all of the capabilities fielded, there is limited confidence outside of DoD that that CDRT process will ever identify, assess, and validate all of the capabilities that have been sent to theater. "Moreover, without visibility over the universe of tactical nonstandard equipment, the Army cannot project reset and sustainment costs for this equipment, and ensure that equipment is only being funded to the extent needed to meet continuing needs."
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Speed of Conversion to the Traditional Acquisition System
The final critical outcome of the CDRT process is to take the validated APC and EC systems and quickly integrate them into the traditional acquisition framework. This Table 2 . 
Conclusion
As the Army initiates efforts to add the REF to its permanent structure and fund its ONS based efforts within its FY15 base budget the demand to execute rapid acquisition efforts will not disappear. As a result, the need for an effective transition process during a period of budgetary austerity will remain. The following steps are necessary to reduce the process shortfalls that currently exist:
a. Identify Phase.
(1) Do not use the CDRT process as a forum for approval of Army Special
Operating Forces to Conventional Forces capability transition. It should remain tightly focused on JUONS/ONS based rapid acquisition efforts.
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(2) Assign the Army G-8 as responsible agent for maintaining an accurate list of all capabilities fielded under JUONS/ONS to eliminate the ad-hoc nomination process.
b. Assess Phase.
(1) Future CDRT iterations should be implemented via official tasking through the Army G-3 to the Operational Army.
(2) CDRT feedback should be submitted at the Brigade level and approved at the Division level prior to transmittal to TRADOC ARCIC.
c. Recommend Phase.
(1) Redefine the APC/EC category to allow for <10% "Terminate" categorization.
This will eliminate an otherwise successful system from being downgraded to "Sustain"
by one or two opinions that seem divergent from the rest of the assessments.
d. Validate Phase.
(1) All categories should be discussed in detail at the ARCIC COC and vetted through the TRADOC Commander to Army leadership.
(2) TRADOC should implement off-cycle Iterations to re-review the estimated 430 capabilities currently in the sustain category.
(3) Status of CDD/CPDs for all previously approved APC should be updated by the CDRT COE representatives as part of the AR2B GOSC and Commanding General, TRADOC review.
There will be resistance to implementing these adjustments to the CDRT process from several stakeholders. The Operational Army is likely to complain about additional requirement to issue a formal tasking and the direct Brigade and Division staff 21 representative involvement. However, this is the best way to ensure the feedback from the force is complete, accurate, valid, and reflects the opinion of the senior operational warfighter. This revised process will also require additional work from TRADOC. It will initially create a backlog of work as they conduct a detailed review and assessment of all the current "Sustain" capabilities and brief them to the TRADOC Commander and Army Senior leadership. Although labor intensive, it will clearly indicate to GAO and others that the claims that the Army is not making the required tough financial decisions are inaccurate. The TRADOC COE's will not likely embrace the increase visibility given to the CDD/CPDs that are required to be derived by this process. However, increasing the frequency of updates by the COEs action officers to the AR2B GOSC and TRADOC
Commander will ensure proper prioritization of these efforts through completion.
It is incumbent on the Army to take a hard look at the existing CDRT process and implement the suggested controls to insure that it continues to identifies the right capabilities, accurately assesses them, and then makes the difficult choices of which capabilities it keeps and which are no longer of benefit to the war fighter or can no longer afford. The success or failure of this process will directly impact the size of the pool of resources available to the force of the future.
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